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1AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE – ITS IMPORTANCE 
TO THE EXTERNAL AUDITOR'S ROLE  IN 
BANKING REGULATION AND SUPERVISION
Marianne Ojo ( marianneojo@hotmail.com) Oxford Brookes University 1
ABSTRACT 
The   role   of   the   external   auditor   in   the   supervisory   process   requires   standards   such   as  
independence,objectivity  and  integrity  to be  achieved. Even  though  the  regulator  and  external  auditor  
perform  similar  functions,  namely the verification  of    financial   statements,  they  serve  particular 
interests. The  regulator  works  towards  safeguarding  financial  stability  and  investor  interests.  On  the  
other  hand, the external  auditor  serves  the  private  interests  of  the  shareholders  of  a company. The  
financial  audit  remains  an  important  aspect  of  corporate  governance  that  makes  management  
accountable  to  shareholders  for  its  stewardship  of  a  company2.  The  external  auditor  may  however,  
have   a   commercial   interest   too.  The  debate  surrounding  the  role  of  external  auditors  focusses  in  
particular on auditor independence. A  survey  by  the  magazine “Financial  Director”  shows  that  the  
fees  derived  from  audit  clients in  terms  of  non-audit  services  are  significant  in  comparison  with  fees  
generated  through  auditing.3  Accounting  firms  sometimes  engage  in  a  practice  called  “low  balling”  
whereby  they  set  audit  fees  at  less  than  the market  rate  and  make  up  for  the  deficit  by  providing  
non  audit  services.  As  a  result, some  audit  firms  have  commercial  interests  to  protect  too. There  is  
concern  that the auditor's interests to protect shareholders of a company and his commercial interests  do  
not  conflict  with each  other.  Sufficient  measures  need  to  be  in  place  to  ensure  that  the  external  
auditor's  independence  is  not  affected. Brussels proposed a new directive for auditors to try to prevent  
further scandals such as those of Enron and Parmalat.4 The new directive states that all firms listed on the  
stock market must have independent audit committees which will recommend an auditor for shareholder  
approval.5 It also states that auditors or audit partners must be rotated but does not mention the separation  
of auditors from consultancy work despite protests that there is a link to compromising the independence of  
auditors.6  However this may be because Brussels also shares the view that there is no evidence confirming  
correlation between levels of non-audit fees and audit failures and that as a result, sufficient safeguards are  
in place.7 
This paper aims to consider the importance of auditor independence in the external auditor's role in banking 
regulation and supervision.  In  doing so,  it  also considers factors which may threaten independence and 
efforts which have been introduced to act as safeguards to the auditor's independence. It will also support the 
claim that auditor independence is indeed central to the auditor's role in banking regulation and supervision.
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2  INTRODUCTION
 Banks  are  unique  institutions  in  that  they  are  vulnerable  to  a  “run”  or  a  process  whereby depositors 
withdraw  money/exhaust  their  bank  accounts if adverse opinions about them are disclosed to the capital 
markets  and depositors8.  This makes the job of the external auditor more difficult. If an adverse report  is 
given about the bank in the audit, this could have serious implications for the bank. On the other hand, an 
adverse  report or qualified audit could maintain the credibility of the auditor. Faced  with  this dilemma, the 
involvement of the auditor in other non-audit engagements could determine his willingness to qualify the 
audit report. He  knows that he would most likely lose his contract if he qualified the report. If this would 
result to the loss of a lucrative  contract, he might consider thinking twice about qualifying the audit.
The  UK  professional  guidelines9  highlight  that  independence  is  about  ensuring  that  the  audit  is 
undertaken  with  a  spirit  of  independence.  The  guidelines  suggest  that  this  can  be  done  even  when 
non-audit  services  threaten  objectivity10.  However  the  guidelines  do  not  identify  which  non-audit 
services  undermine  independence.11
Factors  which  have  resulted  to  debates  over  the  issue  of  the  auditor's  independence  often  involve  the 
provision of non audit services by external auditors. Following the collapse of Enron, many argued that the 
provision  of  non-audit  services  such  as  consultancy  services  by  Arthur  Andersen,  had  caused  Enron's 
problems. However, reports showed that off-balance sheet instruments had created problems. In considering 
the importance of auditor independence to the external auditor's role in banking regulation and supervision, 
the first part of this paper considers changes which have taken place over the past two decades and why a 
general banker now requires the expertise of an external auditor. It will also consider why the imposition of a 
statutory duty is considered necessary given the fact that there is potential of “conflict of interest” between 
interests which the external auditor seeks to protect and that which the regulator may seek to protect The 
changing role of the audit will then be discussed as this explains its importance in the banking industry. 
Issues relating to auditor-client confidentiality also abound and even though certain “Statements of Auditing 
Standards” state a duty of the external auditor  to report to the regulator12, more accountability would be 
ensured if the duties were governed by statute as opposed to delegation to self-regulatory bodies.
The self-regulatory regime of the UK accountancy profession is then discussed and this leads to a discussion 
of “regulatory capture”- regulatory capture being equivalent to compromise of the auditor's independence but 
applicable to regulators. Efforts to improve independence within the self-regulatory regime and reduce the 
possibility of capture occurring will also be discussed. Steps to improve accountability also count towards 
efforts aimed at improving independence. Enforcement related issues are then considered  - enforcement 
being another  of  the  auditor's  key  tools  in  banking supervision and  also being crucial  to  the  Financial 
Reporting and Reviewing Panel work. In addition to those regulatory reforms which occurred within the self-
regulatory  regime  of  the  Financial  Reporting  Council,  the  FRC,  other  regulatory  reforms  such  as  the 
development  of  a  framework  for  corporate  governance  and  establishment  of  audit  committees  will  be 
considered. Measures in place to safeguard the auditor's independence are discussed when issues such as 
non-audit services, the reporting accountant and mandatory rotation of audit firms are discussed. Following 
the collapse  of  Enron,  the Financial  Accounting Standards  Board,  the FASB, saw cooperation with the 
International Accounting Standards Board, the IASB, as a way of restoring its credibility and that of its 
8 Supra note 3  at pg 6
9  The  Institute  of  Chartered  Accountants  England  and  Wales  Guide  to  Professional  Ethics; also see D. Singh 
'The role of third parties in banking regulation and supervision' Journal of International Banking Regulation  Volume 4 
No 3 , 2003, at pg  8
10  D.  Singh   'The  role  of  third  parties  in  banking  regulation  and  supervision'  Journal  of  International  Banking  
Regulation  Volume 4 No 3 , 2003, at pg 8
11 ibid
12 See SAS 620 Revised and SAS  120 Revised
3standards.13 In this respect and given the problems of non audit services being cited during the collapse of 
Enron, accounting practices in the UK and the US and the International Accounting Standards Board will 
also be considered.
An analysis of various parliamentary reports, statutes such as  the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, 
case law, journals and annual reports will provide a basis for considering the claim that audit independence is 
still a central element to the external auditor's role in banking regulation and supervision.
Definitions of integrity, objectivity and independence
The APB ethical standards govern issues relating to the integrity, objectivity and independence of auditors.14 
Guidance on other ethical matters and statements of fundamental ethical principles governing the work of all 
professional accountants are issued by professional accountancy bodies.15 
Integrity is a  requirement for those acting in public interest and it is vital that auditors act and are seen to act 
with integrity.16 This requires not only honesty but  a wide range of qualities such as fairness,  candour, 
courage, intellectual honesty and confidentiality.17
Objectivity is a state of mind which excludes bias,  prejudice and compromise and which gives fair and 
impartial consideration to all matters that are relevant to the present task, disregarding those that are not.18 
Objectivity requires the auditor's judgement not to be affected by conflicts of interests and that he adopts a 
thorough approach preparing to disagree where necessary with the director's judgements.19 The necessity for 
objectivity  arises  due  to  the  fact  that  many  important  issues  involved  in  the  preparation  of  financial 
statements do not relate to questions of fact but rather to questions of judgement.20
The concept of independence is not the easiest to define. Definitions include :21 “the conditional probability 
of  reporting  a  discovered  breach”  by  DeAngelo  (1981a  :  186);  the  ability  to  resist  client  pressure 
(Knapp;1985) ; a function of character – with characteristics of integrity and trustworthiness being essential 
(Magill and Previts; 1991) ; and an absence of interests that create an unacceptable risk of bias.22  The need 
for independence arises because in many cases, users of financial statements and other third parties do not 
have sufficient information to enable them judge whether the auditors are, in fact, objective.23 The reality and 
notion of auditor independence is vital to public confidence in financial reporting.24 Public confidence in 
financial markets and the conduct of public interest entities relies partly on the credibility of the opinions and 
13 J Godfrey and I Langfield-Smith 'Regulatory Capture in the Globalisation of Accounting Standards' at pg 29
14 Ethical Statement 1 Integrity, objectivity and independence paragraph  5 
<http://www.asb.co.uk/apb/publications/index.cfm>
15 ibid
16 Ethical Statement 1 Integrity, objectivity and independence paragraph  7 
<http://www.asb.co.uk/apb/publications/index.cfm>
17 ibid
18 Ethical Statement 1 Integrity, objectivity and independence paragraph  9 
<http://www.asb.co.uk/apb/publications/index.cfm>
19 Ethical Statement 1 Integrity, objectivity and independence paragraphs   9,11 
<http://www.asb.co.uk/apb/publications/index.cfm>
20 Ethical Statement 1 Integrity, objectivity and independence paragraph    10 
<http://www.asb.co.uk/apb/publications/index.cfm>
21 V. Beattie, S.Fearnley, R. Brandt 'Behind closed doors : What company audit is really about'  Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in England and Wales (2001) at pg 19
22 The AICPA White Paper definition (AICPA, 1997) defines independence as an absence of interests that create an 
unacceptable risk of bias.
23 Ethical Statement 1 Integrity, objectivity and independence paragraph  13 
<http://www.asb.co.uk/apb/publications/index.cfm>
24   D. Singh  'The role of third parties in banking regulation and supervision' Journal of International Banking 
Regulation  Volume 4 No 3 , 2003, at  pg 18
4reports given by auditors in relation with financial audits.25 
Ethical Standard 1 requires that in complying with integrity, objectivity and independence, responsibility lies 
with the audit firm.26 This is where the weaknesses highlighted in the “Enforced  Self Regulation Model” 
appear – in particular, the weaknesses of self regulation.27Paragraph 17 of ES 1 goes on to say that the audit 
firm establishes policies and procedures to promote and monitor compliance with those requirements by any 
person  in  a  position  to  influence  the  conduct  and  outcome  of  the  audit.   Direct  monitoring  of  listed 
companies and other entities in whose financial situation there is major public interest , is the function of the 
Public Oversight Board.28 It is bad enough that no state monitoring is involved in this system of delegated 
self-regulation and one would expect a form of accountability in the shape of increased monitoring than is 
presently carried out by the POB. Now that the scope of the POB has been extended to cover regulation of 
the actuarial profession, it is questionable if there is sufficient dedication of resources towards the monitoring 
of accountancy firms as was the case when the POBA existed. Post- Enron reforms which led to the APB 
being  responsible  for  setting  standards  on  objectivity,  integrity  and  independence  have  improved  the 
standard setting process and provided more consistency to the way standards are interpreted. The Financial 
Reporting Review Panel examines annual accounts of public and large private companies to check whether 
they  are  complying  with  the  requirements  of  the  Companies  Act  1985 including  applicable  accounting 
standards.29
In  April  2005,  the  FRRP piblished  a  revised  Memorandum of  Understanding  in  which  the  panel  will 
cooperate closely with the FSA on enquiries related matters of listed companies.30 This is a significant step 
towards ensuring the co-ordination of accounting enforcement activitie sin the UK for which the FRRP and 
the FSA share responsibility31. Besides carrying out 286 reviews in 2005/2006, the FRRP also extended its 
enforcement programme by reviewing the annual accounts of a wider range of entities and reviewing for the 
first time interim accounts starting with those prepared for periods beginning on or after 1 January 2005.32
 
Developments in the banking supervisory process
About two decades ago, internal control systems would not have featured highly in an analysis of banks and 
their supervision.33 A general banker can no longer expect or hope to understand in depth all the activities 
which go on in a bank because change has occurred over the years that the necessary skills and experiences 
are held in individual specialist areas.34 Systems and controls have ceased to be tangible and book keeping 
has been replaced by electronic pulses.35 
The high point of the process of reports from accountants on systems was the 'trilateral meeting' when the 
bank being reported on, the reporting accountant and the Bank of England reviewed the contents of the 
report together.36 Not only were the reporting accountants nervous about the effects of some of the exchanges 
of information on their relationship with their client - the bank, but the bank clients too.37 As a result, there 
25 Ethical Statement 1 Integrity, objectivity and independence paragraph  4 
<http://www.asb.co.uk/apb/publications/index.cfm>
26  See Ethical Standard 1 paragraphs  15 - 26
27  For more information about the Enforced Self Regulation Model, see article “The Financial Services Authority : A 
Model of Improved Accountability?” pp 6 and 7. In addition, see I Ayres and  J Braithwaite Responsive Regulation 
: Transcending the Deregulation Debate  ( New York : Oxford Union Press 1992) pps 100- 125
28  See Frc Annual Report 2005/2006 at pg 13
29  See FRC Annual Report 2005/2006 at pg 14
30  Ibid at pg 14
31  ibid
32  ibid
33 B. Quinn  ' The Bank of  England and the development of internal control systems' at pg 35
34 Ibid at pg 37
35 Ibid at pg 38
36 Ibid at pg 42
37 ibid
5was potential damage to what could be a co-operative relationship.38 In the light of the above circumstances, 
the 1987 Banking Act concluded that auditors should have the ability but not the statutory duty to report to 
the Bank of England about  concerns  which related to  the  ability of  their  client  to  meet  the criteria for 
authorisation. 
However the protection of stakeholders should be paramount and have priority over the potential  for  a 
damaged relationship between auditor  and client.  As will  be  shown later  on in  this  paper,  co-operative 
relationships can still exist where there is mutual respect between both parties and where their standards and 
levels of integrity are not compromised. As a result, the non imposition of a statutory duty is unjustifiable. 
For the external auditor, there is always the possibility of conflict of interests occurring especially as a result 
of serving two masters – his client and the regulator .  The reality of   a situation involving “conflict  of 
interests” occurring to an auditor during the performance of his  duties may be more than or equally as 
probable as that of a potential damage to an auditor-client relationship. A statutory duty would however 
provide better accountability mechanisms than a system governed   solely by self-regulation.  As a result, the 
recommendation  made by  Lord Justice  Bingham that  the  ability  to  report  to  the  supervisor  should be 
replaced by a statutory duty to do so in  specified circumstances is long overdue. 
The role of the audit
The primary aim of the audit today is the verification of financial statements. The audit is an important part 
of the capital market framework as it not only reduces the cost of information exchange between managers 
and  shareholders  but  also  provides  a  signalling  mechanism to  the  markets  that  the  information  which 
management  is  providing  is  reliable.39 The  auditor  provides independent  verification  on  the  financial 
statements of a company and as a result, the audit  loses its value when such independence which gives 
credibility to the financial statements, is undermined. According to accounting literature, the traditional role 
of  the  audit  was  mainly  the  detection  and  prevention  of  fraud.40 The  move  to  verification  of  financial 
statements arose from the growing investment in the railway, insurance and banking industry41. Suggestions 
have been made that this situation occurred because in these particular industries, the shareholding was more 
dispersed and more priority given to financial performance rather than on management's honesty.42 Bank 
failures such as those of BCCI and Johnson Matthey resulted to a re-think of the objective of an audit to 
include the detection and prevention of fraud.43
The auditor's role and duty
The first time that the role of the auditor was formally addressed in British banking regulation was when the 
right to communicate was introduced in the Banking Act 1987.44 Section 47 of the Banking Act 1987 gave 
the auditor the right to report any matters of prudential concern to the Bank of England45. In its notice to 
auditors, the Bank's first example of circumstances to be reported is breach of the trigger capital ratio set by 
the Bank.46 As long as auditors had communicated in good faith, they were not considered to have breached 
any  duty  of  confidentiality.47 Apart  from  a  duty  to  communicate  matters  of  concern  immediately  to 
prudential supervisors, the auditor was granted powers to furnish “special” reports under sections 39 and 41 
of the Banking Act 1987.
38 ibid
39 Supra note 2
40 Supra note 3 at pg 3
41 Ibid  at pg 3
42 ibid
43   ibid
44 Vieten pp 167 and 168
45 Ibid at pg 167
46 ibid
47 Vieten at pg 167
6The Bank of England commissions 2 types of reports namely the section 39 reports  48 and the section 41 
reports49 .  During  the  course  of  1995 and 1996,  647  section 39 reports  and  2  section 41 reports  were 
commissioned.50  The collapse of Johnson Matthey Bankers led to the introduction of section 39 reports in 
the Banking Act 1987. The Bank of England further responded to the failure of JMB by introducing review 
teams which visited financial institutions for 2 or 3 days and longer for complex reviews.51 The level of 
reliance placed on the accounting profession is also demonstrated through the Bank of England's Report for 
1994/95.52
The Bingham Report on the BCCI affair proposed changing the auditor's right to communicate into a duty.53 
The Board of Banking Supervision recommended extending section 39 reports to subsidiaries in foreign 
jurisdictions and to replace annual section 39 reports with a more flexible approach based on regulatees' 
changing circumstances.54 The relationship between supervisory authorities and the external auditors of a 
credit institution and the duties of these auditors was identified as an important lesson from the BCCI case.55 
Because of auditors' access to financial undertakings' accounts and other essential material, they are in a 
position to play an important role in the overall supervisory process.56
An analysis  of  BCCI showed that measures,  additional  to those already existing,  needed to be taken to 
eliminate (i) The opaqueness of financial structures and (ii) Strengthen co-operation between all bodies or 
persons involved in the supervision of such complex financial structures57. As a result, the Basle Committee 
for  Banking  Supervision  issued  “minimum standards”  which  lay  down rules  for  effective  consolidated 
supervision and the co-operation of supervisory authorities. This was aimed at strengthening international 
co-operation  between prudential  supervisors  and to  improve  transparency of  financial  and in  particular, 
group and international structures.
Apart from their ability to audit the capital adequacy ratio, bank regulators rely on the expertise of auditors in 
terms of the technology they possess. Until 1987, banking supervision relied mainly on prudential returns 
and  other  disclosures  made  voluntarily  by  the  management  of  authorised  institutions58 -  however,  this 
practice was open to abuse.
The collapse of Johnson Matthey Bankers also drew attention to the possibility of auditors failing to conduct 
detailed inquiries about quality of bank loans, quality or effectiveness of internal controls and that accuracy 
of prudential returns could be totally unjustified.59  As a result of this, more detailed statutory arrangements 
were introduced, paving the way for a direct  involvement of bank auditors in the supervisory process60 
through their role as alternative bank examiners and the extension of auditor liability. Generally producers of 
consumables owe a “duty of care” to third parties. However it was held in Caparo Industries plc v Dickman 
and Others61 that generally, auditors only owe a duty of care” to the company as a legal person and that they 
do not owe a “duty of care” to any individual shareholder, creditor,pension scheme members or any other 
stakeholder.62  
48 These examine aspects of accounting and prudential reporting and internal control systems; see Vieten at pg 169. 
They are also commissioned regularly.
49 These are commissioned on an exceptional basis where areas of concern have been identified
50 Supra note 28 at pg 169
51 Ibid  at pg 172
52 At page 39; also see Vieten at pg 172
53 HC 198, 1992; see Vieten at pg 172
54 HC 673,1995 pg 261  ; see Vieten at pg 172
55. J.F Mogg ' The Bank of  England and the development of internal control systems' at pg 31
56 Ibid  at pg 32
57  ibid at pg 28
58 Hadjiemmanouil at pg 168
59 Ibid at pg 168
60 Ibid pg 169
61 (1990) 1 All ER HL 568
62 See House of Commons Select Treasury Committee, Further memorandum submitted by Professor Prem Sikka 'The 
Institutionalisation of Audit Failures : Some Observations' at pg 21
7The government has been criticised for failing to give more protection to audit stakeholders as the regulating 
accounting bodies often campaign to demand liability and other concessions for auditing firms.63  It has also 
not  fully considered why auditing firms would have any economic incentives to reflect on the negative 
consequences of their activities – especially in the absence of a “duty of care”.64 The Department of Trade 
and Industry, the DTI, having joint responsibility for regulating the UK auditing industry, has also been 
criticised for not having adequate staff to perform duties of  examining unexpected corporate collapses and 
frauds.65 The inspectors it appoints to examine these collapses have been said to rarely examine the impact of 
organisational culture and values on audit failures.66 Prem Sikka adds that the threat of a punitive action by 
the DTI could create  economic  incentives for  accounting firms to  reflect  on the consequences of  there 
actions  –  as  a  reduction  in  their  revenue,  due  to  fines  incurred,  would  make  them think  twice  before 
indulging in acts with negative consequences. Since the Companies Act 1989, the accountancy bodies have 
formally been given powers to act as regulators of the UK auditing industry and Prem Sikka states that 
accounting bodies could call for changes to the legal and institutional structures in order to persuade auditing 
firms to revise values that influenced an audit.67 However, they are influenced by pursuit of their economic 
interests68 - hence a  situation involving a 'conflict of interest' arising. The issue relating to the aftermath of 
BCCI is mentioned where following the Bingham Report,  Lord Justice Bingham proposed a statutory duty 
to be owed by the auditor but the auditing industry still opposed the imposition of any “duty” to report 
financial irregularities to the regulators69.
The use of auditors as bank examiners has transformed the traditional relationship between auditors and their 
clients. In cases where auditors acted on behalf of regulators  and were not directly employed by banks, they 
were also like third parties.  However where auditors were employed by banks - their clients,  a duty of 
confidentiality was still owed to the banks and this would be breached if they communicated information to 
the Bank of England. As a result, the Banking Act 1987 removed the auditor's duty of confidentiality to their 
client institution in relation to matters communicated to the Bank in good faith.
Secondary legislation introducing a duty to report apparent irregularities under appropriate circumstances 
came into force on the 1st May 1994.70  Under domestic provisions, bank auditors and reporting accountants 
were obliged to report to the Bank their concerns whenever they had reasonable cause to believe that any of 
the minimum criteria for authorisation as a deposit-taker had been breached.71.
The  prudential  returns  of  authorised  institutions  and  meetings  between  their  senior  management  and 
supervisors were the Bank of England's main sources of information.72 However the Bank expected bank 
auditors and reporting accountants to play a direct role in the regular supervisory process. Although the 
Banking Act 1987 paved way for direct bilateral communication between bank auditors and the Bank of 
England, the Bank recognised that accountants should not be asked to act in ways which would undermine 
their professional relationship with their clients and  accordingly continued to put primary responsibility for 
conveying any vital information on the authorised institutions themselves.73 
63 ibid
64 ibid
65 ibid
66 Ibid 
67 Ibid at pg 22
68 Ibid 
69 ibid
70 Accountants  (Banking Act 1987) Regulations 1994, S.I. 1994/524 ; see Hadjiemmanouil at pg 172
71 Ibid at pg 172
72 ibid at pg 174
73 Hadjiemmanouil at pg 174
8Statement of Auditing Standards (SAS) 620 Revised : The Auditor’s Right and Duty To Report To 
Regulators in the Financial Sector
The International Standard on Auditing (ISA UK and Ireland) 250 sections A and B also respectively deal 
with consideration of laws and regulations in an audit of financial statements and the auditors' right and duty 
to report to regulators in the financial sector .
According to the Statement of Auditing Standards (SAS) 620 which replaced the original SAS issued in 
1994, directors of regulated entities have primary responsibility for ensuring that all appropriate information 
is made available to regulators. Auditors’ reports on records, systems and returns, regular meetings with 
directors  and/or  senior  management  supplemented  by  any  inspection  visits  considered  necessary  by 
regulators should provide regulators with all the information they need to carry out their responsibilities. 
Through the auditor’s involvement  in the regulatory and supervisory process,  the possibility of capture 
occurring could be reduced significantly as personnel exchange or frequent contact between the regulator 
and the regulated is reduced.
Auditors have routine reporting responsibilities and also responsibilities to provide a special report required 
by the regulator. In addition, auditors are required by law to report, subject to compliance with legislation 
relating to “tipping-off”, direct to a regulator when they conclude that there is reasonable cause to believe 
that a matter is or may be of material significance to the regulator.
 Under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 ( Communication by Auditors) Regulations 2001 ( “ the 
2001 Regulations”), the auditor has duties under certain circumstances to make reports to the FSA74. The 
2001 Regulations also do not require the auditor to perform any additonal work because of the the statutory 
duty nor is the auditor required to specifically look out for breaches of  the requirements applicable to a 
certain authorised firm.75
Section 342 of the FSMA 2000 also  76provides that no duty to which an auditor of an authorised firm is 
subject shall be contravened by communicating in good faith to the FSA information or an opinion on a 
matter that the auditor reasonably believes is relevant to any functions of the FSA.
Confidentiality
74 See ISA (UK and Ireland) 250 section B paragraph 54 of the Auditor's Right and Duty to Report to Regulators in the 
Financial Sector
75 ibid
76 See ISA (UK and Ireland) 250 section B paragraph 82 of the Auditor's Right and Duty to Report to Regulators in the 
Financial Sector
9In accordance with SAS 620, auditors are entitled to communicate to regulators information or opinions in 
good faith about matters relating to business or affairs of the entity or any associated body. However, this 
relates to information and opinions obtained in their capacity as auditors. Auditors and regulators should be 
aware that confidential information obtained in other capacities may not be normally disclosed to another 
party.
Even though confidentiality is an implied term of auditors' contracts  with authorised firms, section 343 of 
the FSMA states that an auditor of an entity closely linked to an authorised firm who is also the auditor of 
that authorised firm does not contravene that duty if he reports to the FSA information or his opinion, if he is 
acting in good faith and if he reasonably believes that the information or opinion is relevant to any function 
of the FSA.77
 Statements of Auditing Standards (SAS) 120 Revised : Consideration of law and regulations
The  revised  Statement  of  Auditing  Standards  (SAS)  120  replaced  the  original  SAS  issued  in  1995. 
According to the Auditing Practices Board, the purpose of this SAS is to establish standards and provide 
guidance on the auditor’s responsibility to consider law and regulations in an audit of financial statements.
 
Responsibilities of the auditors
According to the Auditing Practices Board,78 ‘it is not the auditor’s function to prevent non-compliance with 
law and regulations. The fact that an audit is carried out may, however, act as a deterrent.’ An audit is not 
expected to detect all possible non-compliance with law and regulations. The responsibilities of auditors of 
private sector entities as regards law and regulations are similar to those of auditors of limited companies and 
other entities in the private sector.
Auditors should plan and perform their audit procedures, evaluate and report on the results thereof, 
recognising  that  non-compliance  by  the  entity  with  law  or  regulations  may  materially  affect  the 
financial statements (SAS 120.1). This can be done through 79 : (a) obtaining a general understanding of the 
legal and regulatory framework applicable to the entity and the industry, and of the procedures followed in 
order to ensure compliance with that framework; (b) inspection of correspondence with relevant licensing or 
regulatory authorities; (c ) making enquiries with directors as to whether they are aware of notice of any such 
possible instances of non-compliance with law and regulations; and (d) obtaining written confirmation from 
the directors that they have disclosed to the auditors all those events of which they are aware which involve 
possible non-compliance, together with the actual or contingent consequence which could arise there from. 
77 See ISA (UK and Ireland) 250 section B paragraph 75 of the Auditor's Right and Duty to Report to Regulators in the 
Financial Sector
78  see www.frc.org.uk
79  SAS 120.3
10
Procedures to be followed  when possible non-compliance with law or regulations is discovered.
According to SAS 120.5, auditors should obtain an understanding of the nature of the act, the circumstances 
in  which  it  occurred  and  sufficient  other  information  to  evaluate  the  possible  effect  on  the  financial 
statements when they become aware  of information which indicates that non-compliance with law may 
exist.
They should then document their findings and subject to compliance with legislation relating to “tipping off” 
and any other requirement to report them direct to a third party, discuss them with the appropriate level of 
management (SAS 120.6).
Auditors should also consider the implications of suspected or actual non-compliance with law or regulations 
in relation to other aspects of the audit (SAS 120.7).  
Reporting non-compliance with law or regulations
Action taken by auditors to  report  a  suspected or  actual  non-compliance with law or  regulations varies 
according to their statutory responsibilities. In accordance with SAS 120.8 and subject to compliance with 
legislation  relating  to  “tipping-off”  and,  save  where  SAS  120.15  applies,  auditors  should  as  soon  as 
practicable,  either  :  (a)  communicate  with  management  and  the  board  of  directors  including  the  audit 
committee, or (b) obtain evidence that they are appropriately informed.
 
Auditors can also : (a ) Report to addressees of the auditor’s report on the financial statements (SAS 120.10); 
(b) Report to third parties (SAS 120.12).
The external auditor's  involvement  in the banking supervisory process
The FSA operates through a mixed system of supervision whereby it inspects banks (on-site  supervision) 
and whereby it utilises external auditors (off-site supervision).
The  effectiveness  of  this  combination of on-site and off-site supervision  can  be  efficiently assessed 
through  a  holistic  examination  of :
1) The  way  in  which  the  audit  profession  is  regulated
2) The  enforcement  of  principles  and  rules  relating  to  the  audit  profession. 
Self-regulation and regulatory capture
The UK accountancy  profession  is  regulated  through  a  process  of  self regulation – even though there is  
state oversight. In this sense, UK accounting may be said to be governed by a mixture of state and self-
regulation.80  The  weakness  of  self  regulation  stems  from  the  fact  that  the  accountancy  profession  is 
acting  as  a watch  dog  over  its  own  members’  affairs and as a result, is more prone to regulatory capture. 
The  Financial  Reporting  Council (FRC)  regulates  the  accounting  profession.  Amongst  its  components, 
the  most  important in  relation  to  issues  of  compliance,  is  the  Financial  Reporting  Review  Panel 
80 Supra note 12 ; Also see page 5 of this paper where it states that the Department of Trade and Industry has joint 
responsibility for regulating the UK auditing industry.
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(FRRP). The FRRP acts as a watch  dog -  to ensure compliance  of  financial  accounts  with  requirements 
of  the  Companies  Act  1985 and  applicable accounting standards. However, it does not offer advice on the 
application of accounting standards or the accounting requirements of the Companies Act 1985.81
Regulatory Capture
Regulatory capture is generally defined as capture of the regulator by the regulated. The theory of regulatory 
capture was introduced by Richard Posner,82 who argued that ‘regulation is not about the public interest at 
all, but is a process, by which interest groups seek to promote their private interest ... Over time, regulatory 
agencies come to be dominated by the industries regulated.’ Characteristics of situations where regulatory 
capture is likely to occur include83 : Where: only one industry is being regulated, where the regulator is part 
of a larger organisation, where there is  conflict  between  regulator and  the  regulated, where regular contact 
occurs  between  the  regulator  and  the  regulated  and/or  where  a  regular  exchange  of  personnel  occurs 
between the  regulator  and  the  regulated.  Standards  (  SASs)  could  help  prevent  conflict  between the 
regulator and the regulated as the external auditor’s involvement in the regulatory and supervisory process, 
according to  the  SASs,  presents a  situation whereby the regulator  becomes less involved – through the 
external  auditor  acting on behalf  of  the  regulator.  Hence there  is  likely to  be less  conflict  between the 
regulator and the regulated. The possibility of regular contact between the regulator and the regulated is also 
less likely where the external auditor acts on behalf of the regulator. Where the regulator is part of a larger 
organisation, the external auditor could still help prevent regulatory capture. The external auditor’s role is to 
work  on  behalf  of  the  regulator,  with  the  relevant  department/s  which  make  up  the  regulator  and 
communicate with the regulated.
The Financial Reporting Council
In 1991, the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) and its subsidiaries were established to address problems in 
the UK related to the quality of financial reporting.84 The previous regime had been inadequate as accounting 
standards were flexible, compliance was poor and no effective enforcement mechanisms were in place to 
deal with directors who breached accounting standards.85 The pressure faced by auditors from directors and 
creative accounting were major issues.  
Parliament  has  delegated a  lot  of  reforms to  self-regulatory bodies.  As illustrated earlier,  statements of 
auditing  standards  (SASs)  govern  the  duty  of  auditors86 rather  than  statutory  imposition  of  a  duty  as 
recommended by Lord Justice Bingham. Statutory control should however provide better accountability and 
provide more effective enforcement measures  than a system of self-regulation. A system of self regulation is 
also likely to be more susceptible to regulatory capture87.
 
The subsidiaries of  the Financial  Reporting Council  included the Accounting Standards  Board (ASB) – 
which became responsible for setting standards; the Urgent Issues Task Force and the Financial Reporting 
81 See www.frc.org.uk (last visited 19 December 2005)
82 See  R. Posner  'Theories of economic regulation' (1974) 5  Bell  Journal of Economics and Management Science pp 
335-358; G. Stigler ' The theory of economic regulation' (1971) 2 Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 
pp 3-21;   J Laffont and J Tirole  ' The politics of Government Decision Making : A Theory of Regulatory Capture' 
(1991) 106 Quarterly Journal of Economics pp 1089-1127. 
83 I Ayres and  J Braithwaite  Responsive Regulation : Transcending the Deregulation Debate   ( New York : Oxford 
Union Press 1992) at pg  115
84 Supra note 12 at pg  6
85 ibid
86 See SAS 620  Revised : The Auditor's Right and Duty to report to regulators in the financial sector;  SAS 120 
Revised : Consideration of Law and Regulations
87 See J.Godfrey and I Langfield - Smith  'Regulatory Capture in the Globalisation of Accounting Standards'   WPG 
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Review Panel.
On the 24 July 2002, an immediate review  of the regulatory arrangements for the accountancy and audit 
professions was called for by Patricia Hewitt, Secretary of State for Trade and Industry. The purpose of this 
review was to  look at  the  way the accountancy and audit  professions were regulated,  consider whether 
changes should be made and whether there should be a statutory basis for regulation.88  On the 11 March 
2003, the Department of Trade and Industry published a  consultation document “Review of the Regulatory 
Regime of the Accountancy Profession : Legislative Proposals” and the aims and objectives of the new FRC 
and its Boards have since been published.89
In 2004, improvements were made to the FRC and its  operating bodies now  include :
The  Accounting  Standards  Board  (ASB),  the  Auditing  Practices  Board  (APB),  the  new  Professional 
Oversight Board for Accountancy (POBA), the Financial Reporting Review Panel (FRRP) and the
Accountancy Investigation and Discipline Board , the AIDB. 
The FRC's aim is to promote confidence in corporate reporting and governance.90 On 1 April 2004, the FRC 
became the UK's unified independent regulator for corporate reporting and
governance, with the following functions:91
• setting, monitoring and enforcing accounting and auditing standards
• statutory oversight and regulation of auditors
• operating an independent investigation and discipline scheme for public interest cases
• overseeing the regulatory activities of the professional accountancy bodies
• promoting high standards of corporate governance
Responsibilities  have been widened to include new activities,  including setting and monitoring auditing 
standards, and deepened to undertake existing tasks, such as the enforcement of accounting standards more 
intensively.92
The FRC's five key objectives are to promote:93
• high quality corporate reporting
• high quality auditing
• high standards of corporate governance
• the integrity, competence and transparency of the accountancy profession
• its effectiveness as a unified independent regulator
The FRC's fourth objective aimed at promoting the integrity, competence and transparency of the 
accountancy profession includes :94
a) Overseeing the way in which the professional bodies exercise their regulatory responsibilities
in relation to their members
• Discussing with individual professional bodies their regulatory processes and following up
where necessary progress on specific issues.
• Developing a programme of cyclical test checks on the regulatory activities of the professional
bodies.
88  Review of the Regulatory Regime of the Accountancy Profession, Report to the Secretary of State for Trade and 
Industry, see   www.dti.gov.uk/cld/post_enron.htm.
89    See   www.accountancyfoundation.com/neworganisation.cfm and    http://www.dti.gov.uk/cld/cgaai-final.pdf  
90See  FRC Annual Report 2004/2005 at p 6 http://www.frc.org.uk/about/annual.cfm last visited 19 December 
2005
91See  FRC Annual Report 2004/2005  at p 6  http://www.frc.org.uk/about/annual.cfm
92 See  http://www.frc.org.uk/about/annual.cfm
93 ibid
94 Ibid at pg 25
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• Publishing reports on:
- Training and Education, which made recommendations for the enhancement of existing
training and education arrangements for accountants
- the professional accountancy bodies' procedures for dealing with complaints and member
discipline.
• Publishing, in February 2005, a new edition of ‘Key Facts and Trends in the Accountancy
Profession’.
b) Operating an independent investigation and discipline scheme for matters which raise or
appear to raise important issues affecting the public interest95
• Finalising and adopting, and keeping under review, the Accountancy Investigation and Discipline Board, 
the AIDB, Scheme and Regulations.
• Preparing and keeping under review procedures for investigation, case referral and case call-in.
• Establishing links with other investigating authorities and regulators.
• Establishing a panel of 36 disciplinary tribunal members.
• Monitoring developments and carrying out preliminary enquiries relating to potential
disciplinary cases.
• Investigating matters relating to Mayflower Corporation plc referred to the AIDB.
c) Establishing standards and guidance for accountants providing assurance services
• Updating the existing SIRs for changes in listing rules arising from the Prospectus Directive,
and developing new SIRs on reporting on prospective and pro forma financial information.
 The Financial Reporting Review Panel (FRRP)96
Enforcement  of  accounting/audit  principles
Enforcement  can  be  defined  as  all  procedures  in  a  country  in  order  to  assure  the  proper  application 
of  accounting  principles97.  The FRRP is a privately organised review panel which investigates  complaints 
that  are  brought  to  its  attention.  The strength  of  this  mechanism  lays  in  the  public  “naming  and 
shaming”  by  means  of  press  communication.  This  is  very  effective  as  companies  will  try  to  avoid 
their  name and  reputation  being  damaged.  The  FRRP  is  an  “oversight  system” and watch dog  for  
large  and  listed  companies.  Weaknesses  are  however  inherent  in  the  FRRP and  they  include :
i) Not  being  able  to  detect  significant  non – compliance  in  company  accounts.
ii) There  is  also  a  gap  in  the  regulatory  framework  in  respect  of  how  certain accounting 
issues  should  be  treated.
Some  commentators  have  suggested  that  the  effectiveness  of  the  FRRP  may  be  improved  through 
introduction of pro-active monitoring and that any proposals for a change should be co-ordinated closely 
with developments in Europe98.
Despite  these  weaknesses,  the  argument  for  the  use  of  external  auditors  is  very  strong.  The  Basel 
Committee  for  banking  supervision  has  highlighted  the  need  for  a  continuing  dialogue  between 
95 Ibid at pg  25
96 Ibid pp 12, 13
97 The Federation des Experts Comptables Europeens  (FEE)
98 House of Commons Select Committee on Treasury Minutes of Evidence submitted by the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants  in England and Wales as part of its inquiry into the arrangements for financial regulation of public 
limited companies in the UK at pg 5 . Also see www.publications.parliament.uk/cgi-bin/ 
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banking  supervisors  and  the  accountancy/audit  profession.  Other  reasons  for  the  need  of  external  
auditors  include:99
1) Banking  supervisors  need  to  be  making  more  use  of  external  auditors  if  they  are  to 
meet  the  requirements  of   the  Basel  Principles  (  Core  Principles  for   effective 
Banking  Supervision).
2) The  increasing  supervisory  focus  on  corporate  governance  and  on  internal  controls 
will  require  supervisors  to  take  account  of  the  views  of  external  auditors.
3) The  increasing  sophistication  of control  and  risk  management  systems  requires  the 
expertise  of  external  auditors.
4) Increased  reliance  on  IT  systems  requires  the  expertise  of  external  auditors.
5) Move   of   banking   supervision   to   oversight   of   process   rather   than   detailed 
examination  requires  skills  which  can  be  provided  by  external  auditors.
6) The  perception  of  a  conflict  of  interest  between  the  role  of  reporting  to shareholders 
and  that  of  reporting  to  supervisors  is more  apparent  than  real  and  is addressed  by 
appropriate  guidance  and  standards,  including  principles  laid  down  by the  Basel 
Committee.
Enforcement  of  audit  standards  appears  in  most  European  countries  at  6  levels  namely :100
1) Self Enforcement : Preparation  of  financial  statements
2) Statutory  audit  of  financial  statements
3) Approval  of  financial  statements
4) Institutional  oversight  systems
5) Court : sanctions  and  complaints
6) Public  and  press  reactions
The Financial Reporting and Review Panel's role is to examine apparent departures from the accounting 
requirements of the 1985 Companies Act, including applicable accounting standards and to seek an order 
from the court to remedy them – if necessary.101 Following the collapse of Enron, reforms were put in place 
by the government.  These reforms included giving the FRRP the task of proactively investigating listed 
company accounts for inaccuracies rather than waiting for a complaint to be made.102 Bittlestone disagrees 
with the views shared by Stella Fearnley and Tony Hines in their column103 that proactive investigation 
would be costly for little benefit. He argues that technology could be adopted by the FRRP at a fraction of 
the costs feared by Fearnley and Hines and that a proactive FRRP would help restore investor faith in the 
ability of financial reporting following such failures as Enron.104 
The FRRP  has commenced a risk-based approach to the enforcement of accounting requirements in
addition to the existing reactive, complaints-driven approach.105 This new combined approach was one of
the main decisions resulting from the Government's review of the regulatory regime for accounting
and auditing and  required significant changes to the way in which the FRRP operates and a significant
increase in the resources devoted to enforcement106.
During 2004/2005, the FRRP also worked with other regulators and Government to complete the necessary 
99 The Role of External Auditors in Financial Services Supervision, Report by PricewaterhouseCoopers researched by 
Dr Oonagh McDonald, summary prepared by Richard Quinn, foreward by John Tattersall, Chairman, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers UK Financial Services Regulatory Consulting Group, November 2000.
100  Federation des Experts Comptables Europeens : Enforcement Mechanisms in Europe. 
101 R. Bittlestone, 'Now for the quake test' , Financial Times, 6th November 2003 ; also see 
www.metapraxis.com/publications/business/quaketest.html
102 ibid
103 See S.Fearnley, T. Hines ' Sour taste of bad law' 25/09/2003
104 Ibid at pg  2
105 FRC Annual Report 2004/2005  See http://www.frc.org.uk/about/annual.cfm at pp 12,13
106 ibid
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preparations for the additional responsibilities which the Panel has acquired under the C(AICE) Act 2004.107 
The extension of the FRRP's remit to include the monitoring of the accounting requirements of the Listing
Rules, coupled with the need for the UK to demonstrate compliance with the EU Standards on national
enforcement arrangements, prompted a thorough review and overhaul of the Memorandum of
Understanding with the FSA.108 The revised MoU reflects a new working relationship between the two
authorities in which there is  co-operation to promote effective monitoring of financial information in the UK
and in which commitment is made to the sharing of relevant information109. At the same time, the FRRP 
developed an MoU with the Inland Revenue which sets out the arrangements through which the Revenue 
may disclose matters relevant to the FRRP's function.110
The FRRP's new responsibilities and powers were reflected in a revised set of operating procedures
which, for the first time, were issued in draft for public comment.111 During the year 2004/2005, the FRRP 
contributed to the development of a harmonised approach to the enforcement of accounting requirements 
across the EU through its role as technical adviser to the FSA.112
The Accounting Standards Board (ASB)113
The ASB's work during 2004/2005 was dominated by the international standard-setting agenda..The ASB 
contributed to the development of IFRS, working with the IASB and other national standard setters.
The ASB also influenced EU policy on accounting standards, including the adoption of IFRSs.
Of the 36 international accounting standards which are mandatory from 1 January 2005, all but one
have been adopted without amendment for use in the EU. The exception is IAS 39 'Financial
Instruments: Recognition and Measurement'. The ASB has been considering its future role in the light of 
international and EU developments and, in March 2005, issued an Exposure Draft of a Policy Statement 
'Accounting Standard-setting in a Changing Environment: The Role of the Accounting Standards Board'.
The ASB published seven UK standards based on IFRS during 2004/2005.114 The
Exposure Draft proposes that the ASB will continue its work to bring about convergence between UK
standards and IFRS - adopting UK standards based on IFRS with no changes other than those that were
essential or justifiable.
During 2004/2005, the ASB also issued a major new standard on life assurance accounting (FRS 27)115. This
followed a request from HM Treasury to carry out an urgent study into the accounting for with-profits
business by life assurers, in the light of the issues raised by the Penrose Report on Equitable Life.
Auditing Practices Board (APB)116
As a result of its post-Enron review of audit and accounting issues, the Government concluded that the 
APB should take responsibility for setting standards for the independence, objectivity and integrity of
auditors (“ethical standards”).117 In November 2003, the APB issued exposure drafts of five new ethical
standards for auditors.118 In developing these exposure drafts, the APB took account of international
107 ibid
108 ibid
109 ibid
110 ibid
111 ibid
112 ibid
113 Ibid pp 8,9
114 ibid
115 ibid
116 Ibid pp 10,11
117 ibid
118 ibid
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developments, including the requirements of the EU Recommendation on the independence of
statutory auditors.119
 The Professional Oversight Board for Accountancy (POBA)120
This is a  new operating body which  has established its role in the regulation of auditing and in overseeing 
the  accountancy  profession  during  its  first  full  year  (2004/2005)  121.  The  POBA  has  undertaken  a 
comprehensive review of the training and education of accountants in the UK, focusing on the way in which 
this influences the quality of financial reporting.122 The objective of the review is to support confidence in 
financial  reporting  through  evaluating  the  adequacy  of  the  training  and  education  arrangements  in  the 
accountancy and audit profession123. The POBA has actively participated in the development of a consistent 
approach to international regulation of auditors - advising the DTI on the European 8th Directive, sharing 
best practice with other international bodies as they evolve124. In 2005/2006, the POBA responsibilities were 
extended  to  include  the  oversight  of  the  regulation  of  the  actuarial  profession.125 To  reflect  its  new 
responsibilties, the POBA changed its name into the Professional Oversight Board.126
Accountability127
The FRC has taken significant steps to ensure that it is accountable for its work, by:
• inviting comments on its Plan & Budget for 2005/06, which it published in December 2004
alongside the Regulatory Strategy
• starting to implement new measures to assess and report on its performance
Apart  from the  regulatory  reforms  which  involved  the  introduction  of  the  FRC,  the  development  of  a 
framework for corporate governance took place and such developments led to the establishment of audit 
committees, concepts such as the separation of duties between chairman and chief executive and an emphasis 
on the need for non-executive directors.
Corporate governance
The Financial Reporting Council's aim is to provide confidence on corporate reporting and governance.128 
Many definitions  have  been  suggested  as  to  what  constitutes  corporate  governance.  Whilst  Keasy  and 
Wright129 define it as the examination of the “structures and processes associated with production,decision-
making,control and so on within an organisation, the Cadbury Committee defined it as “the system by which 
companies are directed and controlled”. Following financial scandals such as those of Polly Peck and BCCI, 
the Cadbury Committee was set up in 1991 by the Financial Reporting Council, the London Stock Exchange 
and the accountancy profession to address the financial aspects of corporate governance.130 The two key 
aspects  of  governance are:  131 Supervision and monitoring of management  performance (  the  enterprise 
aspect)  and   ensuring  accountability  of  management  to  shareholders  and  other  stakeholders  (the 
accountability aspect).
119 ibid
120 Ibid at pp 11,12
121 ibid
122 ibid
123 ibid
124 ibid
125 See FRC Annual Report 2005/2006
126 ibid
127 FRC Annual Report 2004/2005at pp 16,17
128  See FRC Annual Report 2005/2006
129 See K.Keasy and M.Wright  'Issues in Corporate Accountability and Governance : An Editorial'  Accounting and 
Business  Research , 23 (91A) pg 291
130 V. Beattie, S.Fearnley, R. Brandt 'Behind closed doors : What company audit is really about'  Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in England and wales (2001) at pg 27
131 ibid at pg 26
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The Cadbury Report made important references to aspects of internal control systems in the context of all 
public  companies.132 The Cadbury Report  also highlighted that  the  low level  of  confidence in  financial 
reporting and auditing was caused by :133 The absence of a clear framework whereby the directors reviewed 
the  company's  internal  controls;  the  looseness  of  accounting  standards;  and  pressures  on  auditor 
independence.
The report's recommendations were presented as a voluntary Code of Best Practice.134 Compliance with the 
code was however made compulsory by the London Stock Exchange for listed companies after June 1993.135 
Recommendations include :136 That board of directors include a significant number of independent  non-
executive  directors  and that  an audit  committee  comprising independent  directors  be formed; that  audit 
committee should (i) Review financial statements before submission to the full board (ii) Ensure adequate 
resources  for  the  internal  audit  function  and  co-ordination  of  such  function  with  the  external  auditors 
(iii)Appoint and assess remuneration of the external auditors; (iv) that the board report on the effectiveness 
of internal controls and he company's going concern status and that (v) the external auditor  review this 
report.
The Cadbury Report was the first of a series of reports to strengthen corporate governance. Other reports 
include : The Rutterman Report (1994) which recommended that directors disclose the key procedures that 
they had established to provide effective internal financial control;137 the Greenbury Report (1995) which 
recommended the establishment of a remuneration committee comprising non-executive directors and the 
publication of information on directors' remuneration and compensation in the annual report;138 ; the Hampel 
Committee's  Report  (1998)  which reviewed the  implementation of  the  Cadbury Code to  ensure that  its 
original purpose was being achieved139 and the Turnbull Report which builds on corporate governance – 
turning it into a positive management vehicle for risk management and corporate reporting.140 The Turnbull 
Committee recommended a risk-based approach to establishing a sound based system of internal controls.141 
The link between companies' objectives, internal control and risk management in the Turnbull Report which 
requires directors to examine their control of the company on a regular basis further strengthens corporate 
governance.142 In  October 2005, an updated version of “Internal Control : Guidance for Directors on the 
Combined Code “ - also known as the Turnbull Guidance was published and took effect for financial years 
beginning on or after 1 January 2006.143
Audit Committees
 The Cadbury Report highlighted the value of audit committees as internal monitoring device supportive of 
132B. Quinn  ' The Bank of  England and the development of internal control systems' at pg 35
133 V. Beattie, S.Fearnley, R. Brandt 'Behind closed doors : What company audit is really about'  Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in England and wales (2001) at pg 27
134 ibid
135 ibid
136 Ibid at pg  27
137 House of Commons Select Committee on Treasury Minutes of Evidence submitted by the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants  in England and Wales as part of its inquiry into the arrangements for financial regulation of public 
limited companies in the UK  at pg 8 . Also see www.publications.parliament.uk/cgi-bin/ 
138 ibid
139 ibid
140 House of Commons Select Committee on Treasury Minutes of Evidence; Appendix 8; Memorandum from the 
Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy at pg 2
141 House of Commons Select Committee on Treasury Minutes of Evidence submitted by the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants  in England and Wales as part of its inquiry into the arrangements for financial regulation of public 
limited companies in the UK at at pg 10 . Also see www.publications.parliament.uk/cgi-bin/ 
142 House of Commons Select Committee on Treasury Minutes of Evidence submitted by the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants  in England and Wales as part of its inquiry into the arrangements for financial regulation of public 
limited companies in the UK at pg 11
 . Also see www.publications.parliament.uk/cgi-bin/ 
143  See FRC Annual Report 2005/2006 at pg 17
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good corporate governance144. Audit committees were also seen as a mechanism to ensure that an appropriate 
relationship  existed  between  the  auditor  and  the  management  whose  financial  statements  were  being 
audited.145 
Recent Pricewaterhouse survey of chief executive officers (CEOs) and audit  committee chairmen of the 
FTSE 250 companies revealed ten characteristics that the “best” audit committees had in common.146
External auditors and audit committees have significant roles to play in ensuring directors' accountability. 
The Auditing Practices Board notes the potential importance of audit committees in both enhancing the value 
of external audit  to shareholders and helping to re-inforce auditor's objectivity and commitment to high 
quality auditing.147 The Hampel Report also notes that audit  committees form an essential safeguard for 
auditor independence148.
Threats to objectivity and independence
Non audit services
Non-audit  services  may  be  defined  as  any  services  other  than  audit  provided  to  an  audit  client  by  an 
auditor.149 There  are  three  categories  of  non-audit  services  namely150:Services  required  by legislation or 
contract to be performed by auditors of the business; services that will  be better performed by auditors 
because of their knowledge of the business and services which could be provided by a number of firms.
Ethical Standard 5151 describes the general approach to be adopted by audit firms and auditors in relation to 
the provision of non audit services to their audit clients. This approach is adoptable regardless of the nature 
of the non-audit services which are addressed in a given case. Ethical standard 5 paragraph 6 addresses “non 
audit services” as involving any engagement in which an audit firm provides professional services to an audit 
client other than pursuant to :
a) The audit of financial statements; and
b) Those other roles which legislation or regulation state can be performed by the auditors of the entity.
The risks by auditors from providing these services is that it may affect the auditor's independence because 
144 Supra note 12 at pg 29
145 ibid
146 V. Beattie, S.Fearnley, R. Brandt 'Behind closed doors : What company audit is really about'  Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in England and wales (2001) at pg 29. These are as follows : That non executive directors have relevant 
industry experience; that there should exist at least some members with a sound grasp of current developments in 
financial markets; that there be openness to regular training; that there be distinct appointment policies and 
criteria,succession planning and membership rotation; that there be clear delineation between their role and that of 
the full board; that there be clear brief and strategies for setting an appropriate control culture within their 
organisations; that there be regular, clearly structured meetings held at least four times a year; that there exist regular 
flow of relevant,timely information from company executives; that at least annually, a private meeting between each 
of the external and internal audit leaders be held ; and for self-assessment procedures to exist.   
147 APB, 1996, Next Steps  S. Fearnley at pg 30
148 See paragraph 6.9
149 Supra note 2
150 House of Commons , Select Committee on Treasury, Minutes of Evidence at pp 18 and 19 . Also see 
www.publications.parliament.uk/cgi-bin/ Services required by law or contract include regulatory returns eg to the 
FSA, legal requirements in many countries including the UK, for auditors to report on matters such as share issues 
for non-cash consideration; contractual requirements, for example to report to lenders or vendors on net assets, 
covenant requirements etc. Services that are most efficient for the auditors to provide because of their existing 
knowledge of the business include those services listed in category (1) above but where the information derives 
mainly from the audited financial records and such include : tax compliance, where much of the information results 
from the audited financial records and “short form” or other reports in acquisition or reorganisation situations where 
completion is necessary in a very short time. The third category namely services which could be provided by a 
number of firms, include management consultancy, tax advice and human resources consultancy. 
151 Paragraphs  6 to 38
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they may either become too close to the company they are auditing or because their objectivity may be 
challenged due to reliance on income from a single source.152 Arrangements are well in place to deal with 
these risks to protect the auditor's independence.
Firstly, the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales' ethical code forbids auditors to provide 
non-audit  services  to  audit  clients  if  that  would  present  a  threat  to  independence  where  no  sufficient 
safeguards were available.153 Secondly, under provisions of the Combined Code of corporate governance, the 
audit  committee, as representative of the shareholders,  is  required to supervise the relationship with the 
auditors and monitor the nature and scope of non-audit services.154 The audit committee must be sure that the 
independence and objectivity of the auditor is  not compromised.155
It has however been concluded that there is no evidence confirming correlation between levels of non-audit 
fees and audit failures and that as a result,  sufficient safeguards are in place.156  This issue continues to 
generate different opinions and outcomes. Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002, the provision of nine kinds 
of non-audit services from a company's own auditors is now banned.157
The  Chartered  Institute  of  Public  Finance  and  Accountancy  submitted  its  'public  sector  model'  to  the 
Treasury  Select  Committee  following  the  collapse  of  Enron.  This  public  sector  model  provides  many 
measures to safeguard the auditor's  independence – in comparison to that  which operates in the private 
sector.158  Most public service bodies do not appoint their auditors and in the central government, the auditors 
are appointed either by Parliament or by the Secretary of State of the sponsoring department.159 However this 
public sector model was developed for a different sector which requires a wider scope of audit, does not 
directly address multinational entities and the number of appointments made under this model is much lower 
than that for the private sector.160 Nonetheless, it is a model worth considering as it helps a long way in 
catering for the problems brought about where there is no auditor independence.
Self interest threat
This arises when auditors have financial or other interests which might result to them  being reluctant to take 
actions that would be adverse to the interests of the audit firm.161 
Self review threat
152 House of Commons , Select Committee on Treasury, Minutes of Evidence at pg 19 . Also see 
www.publications.parliament.uk/cgi-bin/
153 ibid
154 ibid
155 Ibid ; UK Auditing Standards specifically require that for listed companies, audit engagement partners responsible 
for a company's audit must: Disclose in writing to the audit committee all relationships between the audit firm and 
the client that may affect independence and objectivity; confirm in their professional judgement, the firm's 
independence and objectivity and thirdly, the ethical code specifies that an audit appointment to a listed company 
should  not be accepted if the client provides a significant portion ( 10%) of a firm's gross income. Fourthly, 
shareholders themselves are able to assess the extent of non-audit services provided by auditors.  Companies Acts 
have for some years required the total amount of non-audit fees paid to auditors to be disclosed. 
156   House of Commons , Select Committee on Treasury, Minutes of Evidence on Lessons from Enron at pp 18 and 19 
and  House of Commons Hansard Debates for 19 Oct 2004 (pt 17) Column 806.
157   House of Commons Hansard Debates for 19 Oct 2004 (pt 17) Column 806.
158 House of Commons Select Committee on Treasury Minutes of Evidence; Appendix 8; Memorandum from the 
Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy at pp 2-5
159 Ibid at pg 2
160 ibid
161 Ethical Statement 1 Integrity, objectivity and independence paragraph  28 
<http://www.asb.co.uk/apb/publications/index.cfm>
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This arises when the results of a non audit service performed by the auditors or by others within the audit 
firm are included in the figures disclosed in the financial statements.162 As a result of providing non audit 
service, the audit firm is associated with aspects of the preparation of the financial statements and may be 
unable to give an objective view of relevant aspects of those financial statements.163
Other threats to objectivity and independence include164 : Management threat, advocacy threat, familiarity 
threat and  intimidation threat.
Apart from the responsibility which the audit firm has in establishing policies and procedures designed to 
ensure that it ( the audit firm) and all those who are in a position to influence the conduct and outcome of the 
audit act with integrity, objectivity and independence,  the audit firm also has to identify and assess “threats” 
to auditors' objectivity and  apply procedures which would either :
i) eliminate the threat; or
ii) reduce the threat to an acceptable level.165
The reporting accountant (skilled persons)
Section 166 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 deals with the powers of the FSA to obtain a 
report by a skilled person (reporting accountant) to assist the FSA in performing its functions under FSMA 
2000. Under sections 167 and 168 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, the FSA also has the 
powers  to  appoint  competent  persons  to  carry  out  investigations.  The  differences  between the  roles  of 
reporting accountants (now known as skilled persons) and competent persons are demonstrated by the bearer 
of the costs for work carried out by these persons. For work undertaken by skilled persons, the bank bears the 
cost directly whilst for work undertaken by competent persons, the FSA bears the cost.166 The role of the 
reporting accountant has become so important that it will be incorporated into the entire regulated sector.167 
Even though skilled persons are usually approved by the FSA, the role is usually performed by auditors of 
the regulated firm.168 This raises the question of independence since both roles of auditor  and reporting 
accountant are distinct roles which still overlap occasionally.169 Measures have however been adopted by the 
FSA to safeguard against possibilities of a conflict of interest. Chapter 5 of the FSA Supervision Manual 
provides examples of circumstances where the FSA may use skilled persons. The FSA may nominate or 
approve the appointment of the auditor of a bank as a skilled person if it is cost effective to do so but also 
takes into account any conflicts the auditor may have in relation to the matter to be reported on. There are 
also defined and limited circumstances in which a firm can use skilled persons.170
162 ibid
163 ibid
164 ibid
165 See Ethical Standards 1 paragraph 27. Ethical Standards 5 (Non audit services provided to audit clients) paragraph 
12 also states that before the audit firm accepts a proposed engagement to provide a non-audit service to an audit 
client, the audit engagement partner should : a) Consider whether it is likely that a reasonable and informed third 
party would regard the objectives of the proposed engagement as being inconsistent with the objectives of the audit 
of the financial statements; and 
b) Identify and assess the significance of any related threats to the auditors' objectivity, including any perceived loss 
of independence; and
c) Identify and assess the effectiveness of the available safeguards to eliminate the threats or reduce them to an 
acceptable level. 
166  See J. Hitchins, M.Hogg and D.Mallett  'Banking : A Regulatory Accounting and Auditing Guide' 
PricewaterhouseCoopers  at p 295
167  D.  Singh   'The  role  of  third parties  in  banking  regulation  and supervision'  Journal  of  International  Banking 
Regulation  Volume 4 No 3 , 2003, at pg  9
168  ibid
169 ibid
170  According to chapter 5 of the Supervision Manual, the FSA stated that firms are to appoint skilled persons only for 
specific purposes; not to use them as a matter of routine;to use skilled persons only after having considered 
alternatives; to use skilled persons because of the added value to be gained due to their expertise or knowledge and 
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Mandatory rotation of audit firms
The risk of having an auditor becoming too familiar with a particular business, hence becoming too close to a 
company and compromising his independence is the main reason why mandatory rotation of audit firms has 
been proposed. However, ISA ( UK and Ireland ) 315 requires the auditor to obtain an undestanding of the 
entity and its environment in assessing the risks of material misstatement.171
Whilst supporters of mandatory rotation believe that the auditor's independence would be strengthened as a 
result of making companies change their auditor after a fixed period of years, many have opposed the idea of 
mandatory rotation, arguing that it is a costly exercise. At present, there is no regulatory requirement for UK 
listed companies to change auditors after a number of years in office.172 However due to the threat posed 
where  the same audit  engagement  partner  acts  for  an audit  client  for  a long period,  the UK regulatory 
requirements are that, for listed companies, the audit engagement partner cannot act for more than seven 
years and cannot return to that position for a further five years.173 Overseas studies performed in Italy and 
Spain identify:174 (i) The significant additional costs incurred by firms and management and (ii) the adverse 
effects on audit quality in the early years of appointment (due to lack of cumulative client knowledge) that 
arise from mandatory rotation. Recent reviews in Australia and the Republic of Ireland also concluded that 
the costs of mandatory rotation outweighed the benefits.175
The Recommendation issued by the European Commission Statutory Auditor's Independence in the EU: A 
Set of Fundamental Principles  on 16 May 2002, does not require mandatory rotation of firms but does 
require mandatory partner rotation on listed clients after seven years.176 This differs in some aspects from the 
UK requirements as :177 (i) It allows a return after two years ( not five years as in the UK); (ii) It applies to 
'public interest clients' not just listed clients and (iii) In a group context, it extends to key audit partners other 
than  the  audit  engagement  partner.  No  country  within  the  EU,  with  the  exception  of  Italy  presently 
undertakes  a system of mandatory audit firm rotation.178
At the end of the audit process, when forming an opinion on the financial statements, the audit engagement 
partner should  reach a conclusion that any threats to objectivity and independence have been adequately 
addressed in accordance with APB ethical standards.179 If such a conclusion cannot be reached, the partner 
should not report and the audit firm should resign as auditors.180
CONCLUSION
Gaps/Inconsistencies existing in debates
Dual role of reporting accountant and external auditor
Even though there is support for the dual role of the reporting accountant and external auditor181, the question 
not because of resource restraints; to take into account cost implications and to use the tool in a focused and 
proportionate way.
171 See  www.asb.co.uk/apb/publications/index.cfm
172 S. Fearnley 'Mandatory rotation of audit firms'  pg 1 ; see www.icaew.co.uk/publicass
173 ibid
174 Ibid pg 1 ; Studies carried out in Spain by Arrunada and Paz-Ares entitled  'Economic consequences of mandatory 
auditor rotation' published in 1995 and in Italy by SDA Universita Bocconi in 2002 entitled 'The impact of 
mandatory audit rotation on audit quality and on pricing : the case of Italy' .
175 Ibid at pg 3
176 S. Fearnley 'Mandatory rotation of audit firms'  pg  9 ; see www.icaew.co.uk/publicass
177 ibid
178 ibid
179 Ethical Standard 1 Integrity, objectivity and independence paragraph 43
180 ibid
181 See supra note 3 at pg 10. The Bank of England encouraged the performance of the roles of reporting accountant 
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of independence still arises since both roles of auditor and reporting accountant are separate roles and the 
external auditor could be said to be performing a non-audit service. More safeguards should be in place in 
relation  to  the  dual  role  of  the  external  auditor  and  reporting  accountant  (skilled  person)  and  more 
alternatives should be provided before the role of the reporting accountant is taken as a means of last resort. 
More restrictions should also be placed on circumstances which require the use of a skilled person. Through 
the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, the Financial Services Authority issues rules dealing with the 
appointment of  auditors and skilled persons in  its  Supervision Manual.182 These measures help to  some 
extent to reduce the possibility of a conflict of interest when skilled persons are required to act objectively 
when assessing matters where they were acting in another capacity – for example as auditors.183 SUP 3 of the 
Supervision Manual also highlights the importance of undertaking audit work independently and avoiding 
conflict of interests with the firm.184 The regulated firm, however  has the responsibility of ensuring that 
necessary  steps  are  taken  to  have  an  auditor  independent  of  the  firm.185 This  form of  “Enforced  Self-
Regulation”  may  not  be  as  effective  as  a  situation  whereby  more  responsibility  of  ensuring  auditor 
independence is given to the FSA (as opposed to the regulated firm).
Mandatory rotation
Debate  revolving  round  mandatory  rotation  also  proves  that  mandatory  rotation  of  auditors  may  be 
detrimental.  A cost  benefit  analysis  of   mandatory rotation of  auditors  is  necessary before  deciding on 
whether or not to implement it. There is also the question of how much familiarity the external auditor is 
expected to have before being deemed as having too much familiarity with the firm he audits. Instead of only 
rotating audit partners of firm (since the knowledge acquired from a firm by an auditor is valuable), why not 
also rotate financial  directors or  company executives that deal with audit  engagement partners/  external 
auditors? Companies should have a policy of rotating their  finance directors or  persons in contact  with 
auditors after a certain period of time – that certain period of time probably being shorter than the time 
stipulated under the financial director's original contract of employment . 
In addition, since the cost of acquiring a new external auditor is highest in the first year of engagement, 
techniques could be employed to help enable the auditor acquire knowledge of the business at a quicker 
pace. These techniques could include training sessions organised by the company via a company trained 
employee to help the external auditor improve his knowledge about that company. These sessions should not 
be costly – in comparison to the alternative of a previous auditor who could help train the newly engaged 
external auditor during the first year of his audit work. Here the issue relates to cost and who is able to 
educate the newly appointed auditor at the cheapest and most efficient available means. An external auditor 
with a  high level of integrity would also perform as well in one company where he spent only five years as 
in another company where he spent twenty years. This due to the fact that he would not allow his sense of 
integrity to be compromised as a result of additional services or any other factors which would compromise 
his independence. In such a case, it could be argued that mandatory rotation would be a wasteful exercise.
Audit liability
Auditors should be held more accountable for negative consequences of their actions towards third parties. 
Present situation of the law does not help provide an incentive for them to be accountable for their actions 186. 
As mentioned earlier on page 3, the reality of  “conflict of interests” occurring to an auditor during the 
performance of his duties may be  more than that of a potential damage to an auditor-client relationship. As 
a result, more priority should be given to stakeholders of a firm affected by the consequences of any acts of 
commission or omission rendered by the external auditor.  The investigation of auditor liability in certain 
jurisdictions will help to address how effective the imposition of audit liability in relation to third parties 
and auditor by the same firm. The Bank justified its stance on the argument that the two roles promoted greater 
efficiency because of the prior knowledge of the client. 
182 ibid
183 ibid
184 ibid
185 ibid
186  See Caparo v Dickman  (1990) 1 All ER 568-608;  Caparo v Dickman highlights the fact that there are 
limitations to what an auditor is responsible for
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could be and if, the imposition of liability in these jurisdictions is effective. 
Audit independence or audit liability – which is more important?
The collapse of Enron not only brought about an increased focus on the mode of application of accounting 
standards  (  whether  a  principle  based  or  rule  based  approach  should  be  adopted)  and  enforcement 
procedures. The past few years have also seen a growing trend towards the focus on audit liability.187  The 
IASB's approach to application of standards is principles-based and IFRSs 32 and 39 provide solutions to 
problems of creative accounting posed by off-balance sheet transactions – a major issue in the Enron case. 
The FRRP has adopted a more proactive based approach (similar to post Enron reform adopted in the US). 
This is not to imply that audit independence has lost its importance or is less important than audit liability. A 
lot of work and improvements on audit independence have been carried out over the years and there should 
be an ongoing process of review and further efforts aimed at improvement. 
This   research  carried  out  on  audit  independence  has  also  led  to  a   realisation  that  even  though audit 
independence is a very important area – and probably more important than audit  liability, more work is 
needed in the area of audit liability. Current problems relating to the regulation of hedge funds  could be 
resolved through standards introduced by the accounting profession – as demonstrated on an international 
level by the International Accounting Standards Board through FRSs 32 and 39.
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